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Subversive Property:
Reshaping Malleable
Spaces of Belonging
Sarah Keenan
University of Kent, UK
Abstract
Despite a wide field of scholarship critiquing the idea and workings of property, most
understandings still centre on the propertied subject. This article spatializes property in
order to shift the focus away from the propertied subject and onto the broader
networks of relations that interact to form property. It draws on critical geography,
phenomenology and empirical socio-legal work to argue that property can be understood
as a relationship of belonging that is held up by the surrounding space – a relationship that is
not fixed or essential but temporally and spatially contingent. Building onDavina Cooper’s
analysis of ‘property practices’, I argue that when analysed spatially, the two types of
belonging she discusses – belonging between a subject and an object and between a part
and a whole – become indistinguishable. As such, characteristics generally associated with
identity politics can be understood as property in the sameway that owning anobject can –
in terms of belonging in space. This spatialized understanding shows the breadth of prop-
erty’s political potential. Although property tends to be (re)productive of the status quo, it
can also be subversive. Property can unsettle spaces too.
Keywords
belonging, place, property, space, subversion, unsettling, whiteness
This article spatializes property in order to put forward an alternative political agenda for
it. The article shifts away from the focus on the ‘proper(tied) subject’ and her right to
exclude and instead constructs a theory of property that focuses on belonging in space.
Space is understood as something constantly unfolding and open to change; not the dead
inert matter over which time happens or an already completed story to which an essential
meaning can be attached, but rather, as Doreen Massey puts it, the simultaneity of stories
so far (Massey, 2006). Drawing on this perspective, I argue that property is a relationship
of belonging that is held up by the surrounding space – a relationship that is not fixed or
essential but temporally and spatially contingent. Property happens when a space holds
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up a relationship of belonging, whether that relationship is between a subject and an
object or between a part and a whole. This spatialized understanding of property means
that being white, hetero/homosexual or other such social characteristic generally associ-
ated with identity politics can be understood as having property in the same way as own-
ing a mobile phone can. This understanding of property fits with anti-essentialist
understandings of identity and with a critical geography understanding of place as a pro-
cess and space as dynamic and heterogeneous. But most significantly, it suggests the
possibility of an alternative political agenda for property. For as property is spatially and
temporally contingent, it is also malleable – so while property tends to be (re)productive
of the status quo, it can also be subversive. Property can unsettle spaces too. Rather than
questioning whether subversive property falls within law’s parameters, this article exam-
ines both legal and extra-legal property on the same basis because both have real effects.
It invites a rethinking of what property can do.
The Propertied Subject and the Right to Exclude
The theorization of property as an essential part or extension of the subject has a long
history in Western philosophy, most prominently in the work of Locke and Hegel. Locke
famously argued that ‘every Man has a Property in his own Person’ which he could
expand by mixing his labour with uncultivated or ‘state of nature’ land (Locke, 1978).
Because this appropriation through labour was understood as a kind of natural, god-
given right, no permission from others was required, so long as the appropriator left
‘enough, and as good’ for others (Locke, 1978). According to Locke’s definition then,
property is both an inherent, essential part of the subject (the body’s labour) and a con-
structed extension of it (the land that is cultivated). That property, however, only exists in
and for subjects who are able-bodied, Anglo-European, men of a particular class (Arneil,
2001) – Locke’s ‘every man’ is embedded in class, gender, race and ability1 assumptions
about who can be a proper subject and the most famous legacy of his theory is as a sig-
nificant justification for colonial expansion (Davies, 2007). As well as excluding certain
socially and legally constructed categories of people, Locke’s subject is also assumed to
pre-exist any such categories – the Lockean subject always already has property in him-
self, he does not need to acquire it through any social or legal processes.
In contrast, Hegel’s proper subject only achieves subjectivity through the process of
appropriation – he is not born with property but must acquire it in the process of becom-
ing fully human (Davies, 1994). Hegel argued that the subject begins as an abstract free
will, which is purely individual and thus not yet in a relation with the external world
(Hegel, 1991). The subject ‘must translate his freedom into an external sphere’ by put-
ting his will into external objects and making them his own. His externalized will is then
taken back into himself in the form of property – the subject recognizes that ‘I, as free
will, am an object to myself in what I possess’ (Hegel, 1991). Property for Hegel is thus
an essential part of the process of becoming a proper subject. Whereas Locke’s proper
subject enters the world already fully formed complete with property in his own labour,
Hegel’s subject only reaches a state of subjectivity by acquiring property and in turn hav-
ing his property recognized by another subject. And whereas Locke sees the world as a
place which began in the state of nature and was slowly cultivated into property by ‘the
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civilized part of mankind’, Hegel sees the world as a place in which property is a way for
the individual to recognize and engage with that outside himself as a step towards an
ethical totality (Davies, 2007; Harvey, 1981). Locke and Hegel have in common their
definition of property as something that is an essential part of the proper subject and
an assumption that neither women nor non-white races can be proper subjects.
Locke and Hegel’s theories of property both remain heavily influential in understand-
ings of property today, and are still used by a range of political campaigns to make
arguments about what should count as property. Squatters’ arguments that unused build-
ings should be given to those who use them as homes have strong resonances with Locke’s
justificatory theories of appropriation of unused land (Blomley, 2004), and assertions of
self-ownership have been used by feminist activists in campaigns against the criminaliza-
tion of abortion (Davies and Naffine, 2001). Margaret Radin draws on Hegel’s theory of
the subject formed through property to argue that certain property is market-inalienable
because it is essential to human flourishing or personhood (Radin, 1987, 1993). Radin dis-
tinguishes market-inalienable property from fungible, commodifiable property which
exists primarily for the goal of profit. Radin sees the home as essential for personhood and
makes the argument that there should therefore be greater legal protection for tenants
(Radin, 1993). In making this argument she draws on the Hegelian concept of property
being necessary for personhood.While Radin’s arguments are a powerful rejection of the-
ories that promote universal commodification, her work has been critiqued due to its
appeal to ‘normality’ to determine what constitutes property essential for human flourish-
ing andwhat constitutes inessential, fungible property (Davies, 2007). This unquestioning
appeal to an overarching normality means that Radin’s theory tends to reinforce rather
than challenge the power structures that cause people to unwillingly sell or lose what she
would classify as property essential for human flourishing (Schnably, 1993). This is not to
say that Radin’s argument for greater legal protection for tenants, or the arguments for
self-ownership in the context of abortion or utility in the context of squatting are not useful
for achieving immediate political goals, but that they do reinforce both the centrality of the
subject and the assumption that property is essential to it.
Debates over what counts as whose property continue to be prominent across a
range of political contexts because property is widely understood and enforced as a
particularly formidable right. Although many legal theorists have pointed out the
social constructed-ness of property (Gray, 1991) – persuasively arguing that it com-
prises ‘no more than socially constituted fact’ (Gray, 2007) – most nonetheless still
understand property as operating to give the subject something fixed, permanent and
incapable of being interfered with by others. Although property might be an illusion,
it is an illusion that gives the subject the power to exclude (MacPherson, 1978;
Penner, 1997). This emphasis on exclusion is an important recognition of the social
power of property. While Locke theorized property in terms of a person’s relationship
with a thing (land), modern property theorists have made a point of highlighting that
‘dominium [private power] over things is also imperium [political power] over our
fellow human beings’ (Cohen, 1978).
By focussing on the right to exclude others, these legal theories of property make the
important point that property is not just an extension of the subject but also a relationship
between subjects.
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Using this understanding of property as a right to exclude, Cheryl Harris makes the
argument that whiteness is property. Writing in a United States context but drawing
on histories and arguments applicable to other Anglo-European states, Harris outlines
how property rights are rooted in racial domination to the extent that whiteness is a form
of property (Harris, 1993). While slavery and conquest are no longer legal practices,2 by
essentially maintaining the status quo of a socio-economic system entrenched in racial
inequality, the law continues to recognize what are now the settled expectations of
whites that have been built on the benefits and privileges of white supremacy (Harris,
1993). Harris sees whiteness as a property right which is exercised whenever a white per-
son takes advantage of the privileges accorded to white people simply by virtue of their
whiteness. These vast and complex range of privileges, which might include feeling
comfortable in a traditionally white institution or being more likely to be hired for an
executive job, have the effect of entrenching the systemic exclusion of non-white sub-
jects (Harris, 1993). Harris’ argument defines property as both an element of the subject
(one’s race) and a relationship between subjects (whiteness gives tangible privileges
over non-whites). It thus extends the socio-legal understanding of property as relational
by showing that social characteristics as well as things can be property, though it does not
challenge either the centrality of the property-owning subject or the idea that property’s
power lies primarily in that subject’s right to exclude.
Property and Belonging, Properties and Belongings
An approach that departs more radically from the propertied subject and the right to
exclude is one that inverts the focus on exclusion and instead frames property in terms
of belonging. Theorizing property in terms of belonging rather than exclusion shifts the
focus away from the subject and onto the broader spaces, relations and networks that con-
stitute property. Davina Cooper studied the property regime at Summerhill School, an
alternative school where children choose whether or not to attend class and where rule-
making and dispute resolution involve the school body as a whole (both teachers and chil-
dren) (Cooper, 2007). Cooper describes property practices at Summerhill as involving five
intersecting dimensions, of which belonging is the most important. Belonging is consid-
ered in twoways – firstly the relationshipwhereby an object, space, or rights over it belong
to a subject (‘subject–object’), and secondly the constitutive relationship of part to whole
whereby attributes, qualities or characteristics belong to a thing or a subject (‘part–
whole’). Both understandings of belonging implicate social relations and networks that
extend beyond the immediate subject and object of property – property is instead under-
stood as a set of networked relations in which the subject is embedded (Cooper, 2007). In
order to constitute property, that set of networked relations must not only include one of
belonging between either subject and object or part and whole, but must also be structured
in such away that that relation is recognized and respected, or ‘held up’ by the surrounding
space. This understanding of property thus focuses not on the subject but on the space
around the subject – on the various constitutive relations and the ways in which they are
structured to form networks of belonging that make property.
Property can thus be defined as a relationship of belonging held up by the surrounding
space. Applying this definition to relationships of part–whole belonging resonates with
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Harris’ analysis of whiteness as property. Using the analysis of part–whole belonging,
whiteness can be seen as property because the property-holder is embedded in certain
social relations and networks of belonging. A white person can enjoy particular privi-
leges because he or she belongs to the various social relations and networks that consti-
tute whiteness. As writers such as Ruth Frankenberg have shown, those relations and
networks are complex – whiteness, like all racial categories, is socially constructed
through historically specific fusions of political, economic and other forces; and white-
ness in turn ‘constructs daily practices and worldviews in complex relations with mate-
rial life’ (Frankenberg, 1993). So while whiteness can be said to belong to the white
subject, the white subject also belongs to the complex relations and networks that form
whiteness. If the normative goal is to challenge the way whiteness operates to oppress
and exploit other races, then it is those relations and networks which must be undermined
rather than the individual subjects who belong to them.
While this analysis of whiteness as property in terms of belonging to a network could
also be framed in terms of belonging to a social group, using the framework of networks
acknowledges the many heterogeneous, intersecting factors that at a particular moment
in time constitute a social group, and the importance of the ways in which those factors
connect with each other and with the world outside. I am using the term network simply
to mean an arrangement of intersecting forces or things in space. A subject’s embedded
position within a network of belonging can be used to describe a situation in which a
person has property in her whiteness as well as a situation in which she has property
in her home or her bicycle. This framework thus assists in exploring the question of when
a property becomes property/when belonging becomes a belonging. The understanding
of property as part–whole belonging offers the potential for thinking about the material-
ity of social relations – how possessing a particular social characteristic (such as white-
ness) not only affects the subject’s interactions with other subjects but also the subject’s
interactions with the material space around her. While it seems obvious that subject–
object belonging affects a subject’s interaction with material space, the effect that
part–whole belonging has on a subject’s interaction with material space is less obvious.
Cooper argues that the two types of belonging ‘overlap, combine and reform’ and
thereby ‘provide the context, limits and conditions of each other’s existence’ (Cooper,
2007). It will be argued below that when analysed from a spatial perspective these two
types of belonging-as-property become indistinguishable.
Law as a Network of Belonging
Understanding property as a relationship of belonging held up by the surrounding space
is a departure from understanding property as defined by law3 alone. Cooper’s study
shows that property at Summerhill is defined not just by state law but by a range of social
norms, rules and relations. Law is not the only network of belonging that is capable of
producing property. Nick Blomley makes a similar point in his empirical study of peo-
ple’s understandings of property in a neighbourhood in Canada, where he shows that
while law remains obsessed with delineating between public and private property, in
some instances people think of property as neither private nor public, but as an amalgam
of both (Blomley, 2005). In Blomley’s study, residents had different and ambiguous
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reactions to flowers being planted in bathtubs on a boulevard in their neighborhood by a
group of resident artists. Some viewed the bathtubs as private encroachments on public
space, others saw them as a public good, and others saw them as both an encroachment
and a public good at the same time (Blomley, 2005). Blomley drew from this research to
argue that people live in ‘complicated and overlapping worlds when it comes to suppo-
sedly determinate categories such as property’, with those worlds being defined by var-
ious networks of social rules and relations, including but not limited to law. People’s
experiences of property are far more heterogeneous, complicated and slippery than an
analysis based on property law would suggest.
Thinking about property as a relationship of belonging capable of being formed through
law as well as through other social, cultural and/or political networks helps emphasize the
social and cultural specificity of conventional understandings of property enforced through
law. Framed in terms of belonging, Locke’s theory of property is a justificatory argument for
what belongs towho – Locke argues that a man’s labour and the (‘unused’) landwith which
hemixes his labour both belong to him.This theory thus espouses a framework of belonging
based on the self-owning proper subject and his earned property.
Although Locke’s theory claims to be universal, the networks of belonging in which
his appropriating subject is situated are particular – one must first belong to networks of
whiteness, class, ability and masculinity, and then also to a society that accepts Locke’s
idea that the world is one universal state of nature that belongs to the men who cultivate
it. As colonization spread British law and culture across the empire, so property spread
on a Lockean basis throughout those areas, all but wiping out indigenous networks of
belonging. Thus law did not recognize either the land or the labour of indigenous people
as belonging to them, for they were not recognized as self-owning proper subjects. At the
same time, indigenous people (who, at least in the Australian example, have an entirely
different understanding of property [Rigsby, 1999]) did not recognize the colonizers’
claim to have property in the land merely because they had forcefully taken control and
begun their own kind of agriculture on it. Thus different networks of belonging and con-
tradictory understandings of property existed within the same space, the Lockean under-
standing being violently enforced through law.
This particular disparity in networks of belonging and understandings of property
continues in postcolonial states today. As the legal system is the root of settler land title,
law tends overwhelmingly to protect non-indigenous property. The dominant, legally
sanctioned networks of belonging in relation to land in Australia revolve around the
proper subject discussed earlier, and even arguments for law reform tend to reassert that
culturally specific paradigm of the proper subject. Valerie Kerruish and Jeannine Purdy
explain how the Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 decision which partially
rejected the doctrine of terra nullius in Australia, made a legal identity of ‘native title
holder/claimant’ available for indigenous people within Anglo-Australian law, thereby
re-asserting the dominance of the Anglo-Australian paradigm and recognizing indigen-
ous networks of belonging only as historical fact (Kerruish and Purdy, 1998). The native
title doctrine is thus premised on the assumption that indigenous entitlement to land is a
remnant of the past to be interpreted and judged by Anglo-Australian courts, rather than
an ongoing reality to be determined by indigenous rules and customs. Radin’s argument
that law should protect networks of belonging that ‘social consensus’ defines as essential
428 Social & Legal Studies 19(4)
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to personhood is an example of how arguments for law reform can have the effect of reas-
serting dominant networks of belonging and understandings of property (Radin, 1993).
Social consensus tends to support the dominant networks of belonging, thereby preserving
the status quo and any injustices that are part of that. So to apply Radin’s arguments to the
example of land in Australia, her arguments advocate the increased legal protection of
people’s homes (Radin, 1986) – meaning that all Australians, indigenous and non-
indigenous, should have a home that they can safely assert belongs to them. But while this
position would protect the immediate housing needs of those for whom such a need is
pressing (homeless Australians, indigenous and non-indigenous), it relies on a culturally
specific idea of what ‘home’ means (an enclosed, private physical dwelling), and it avoids
the much larger issues of indigenous dispossession and the ongoing legacies of coloniza-
tion. For many indigenous Australians, home and homelessness have an entirely different
meaning – ameaning that gets drowned out amidst the calls to address the non-indigenous
understanding of homelessness. As Aileen Moreton-Robinson argues,
[In the Australian context] the sense of belonging, home and place enjoyed by the non-
indigenous subject – colonizer/migrant – is based on the dispossession of the original own-
ers of the land and the denial of our rights ... It is a sense of belonging derived from own-
ership as understood within the logic of capital; and it mobilizes the legend of the pioneer,
‘the battler’, in its self-legitimization. Against this stands the indigenous sense of belonging,
home and place in its incommensurable difference. (Moreton-Robinson, 2003)
While the tendency of law to uphold the dominant networks of belonging is particularly
evident in a postcolonial context, it applies in any context in which there are competing
networks of belonging.
Property as Spatially Contingent
The networks of belonging that constitute property for particular subjects at particular
moments are not spread out uniformly across time and space.When things or people belong
somewhere (or according to one network of belonging), they are generally out of
place somewhere else (or according to another such network). Take whiteness as an
example. While whiteness can clearly be seen as a kind of property when a white person
comfortably enters ameeting at a universitywhose history and administration are embedded
inwhite hegemony, it ismore difficult tomake the argument thatwhiteness is propertywhen
a white person, less comfortably, walks into a local store in a poor black neighbourhood.
This is not to assert that these two spaces are in any way equivalent, but simply to show that
property here is not necessarily property there. Property is contingent on space. An under-
standing of property as produced through the interaction of complex networks of social,
legal and other relations of belonging is an understanding of property as a particularmoment
in space. As the heterogeneous, hybrid and conflicting experiences of property found by
both Cooper and Blomley and explored above in relation to disputes over whom the land
belongs to in postcolonial Australia show, property is not fixed in time and space.
But while this understanding of property as spatially contingent can easily be
understood in relation to whole–part belonging, whereby the object of property is a
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characteristic or social attribute, it is somewhat more difficult to understand in relation to
subject–object belonging, whereby the object of property is a thing or a space. While it
might be easy to understand how whiteness is property in some places and not others, it
seems less intuitive to argue that, for example, my mobile phone could be my property in
one place but not in others. As explored above, property is a coveted political claim
because it is generally recognized as fixed and permanent. But subject–object belonging
is spatially contingent too. For the relationship of belonging between ‘me’ and ‘my
mobile phone’ can only exist where networks of social relations have first constructed
‘me’, other networks of relations have constructed the phone, and yet other networks
of relations have constructed the relationship between myself and the phone as one of
belonging. Each of those networks of relations is in turn dependent on a whole range
of interactions, processes and understandings that reach far beyond the networks them-
selves – they are not contained, complete or essential, but rather are constantly evolving.
As such, the seemingly fixed products of those networks (such as identities, places or
things) must be understood as contingent and incomplete processes rather than deter-
mined outcomes or fixed positions. Seemingly static entities are in fact part of a wider
and constantly changing space. Thus in this example, both the seemingly fixed entities
(‘me’ and ‘my phone’) and the relationship of belonging between them are in fact not
fixed but dynamic and contingent.
So it is not so much that the mobile phone is mine, but that that particular phone and
I are, at a particular moment, in a relationship of belonging recognizable as property
because the various social, cultural, legal and other networks in which we are embedded
recognize our relationship as such. Davies makes a similar point about the contingency of
property in her discussion of queer property. Applying an anti-essentialist understanding
of identity to ideas of property, she argues that ‘if we accept that identity is at least partly
an intersubjective, cultural construction and not simply a pre-social attribute then . . .
there is a sense in which identity is never one’s own, but a culturally determined aspect
of one’s person’ (Davies, 1998). If I don’t own my identity, but rather owe it to various
social, cultural, economic and other networks that create my identity, then it follows that
I owe the relationship of belonging I have withmy phone to the various networks that con-
struct that relationship as well. Property is thus understood not as something essential to or
inseparable from the subject, but as a relationship that needs to be constantly reproduced
by the space surrounding it. Carol Rose has similarly argued that property is a kind of per-
suasion – one that requires ongoing reiteration and that affects the subject as well as com-
municating a claim to the outside world (Rose, 1994). If it is accepted that the subject, the
object and the recognizable relationship of belonging between them are each produced by
dynamic, heterogeneous networks interacting simultaneously, then it follows that even
traditional understandings of property as exclusive rights to an object are contingent on
space. There are some spaces – such as cinemas, churches and classrooms – in which I
will not be allowed to use the phone as I please, and there are some spaces where it might
be taken from me altogether. My phone only belongs to me so long as I remain in a space
that creates and recognizes my relationship of belonging with it. This spatial contingency
also applies to public property, where the space recognizes that something belongs to a
range of subjects; and intellectual property, where the space recognizes that an idea
belongs to a particular subject.
430 Social & Legal Studies 19(4)
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Understanding property as spatially contingent suggests a different model of the
subject from Lockean, Hegelian and other more conventional understandings of prop-
erty. For the subject in this understanding is neither pre-social (like Locke’s) nor depend-
ent upon appropriation for its subjectivity (like Hegel’s). Rather, the subject is
constructed by (and thus dependent upon) a whole range of dynamic and heterogeneous
forces. This is a subject that owes its identity to the space around it, including its identity
as the subject of property. According to this understanding, ‘the subject of property’ is a
state of being or an element of a subject’s identity rather than anything fixed, essential or
complete. So while I might be white or the owner of a mobile phone here and now, I
might not be either of those in another time and place; and even in the here and now,
neither of those is all that I am – my status as the subject of property is only a status,
it is not the whole of my identity. Understanding property as spatially contingent also
further illuminates the similarities between subject–object and part–whole belonging.
From a spatial perspective, property as a characteristic (such as whiteness) and property
as a thing or rights to a thing (such as a phone) are both relationships of belonging con-
tingent on the surrounding space. While this understanding of property might be seen as
similar to Hegel’s or Radin’s analyses in that it asserts that a thing external to the self can
be thought of as a part of the self, the understanding of property as a relationship of
belonging sees that relationship as constructed and contingent rather than essential.
Understanding property as a constructed relationship of belonging challenges the distinc-
tion between property and person not because some property is so essential to person-
hood that it is part of the person (as Radin suggests), but because both property and
the person are contingent on surrounding spaces.
Being Properly Oriented
If it is accepted that property is spatially contingent and that both subject–object and part–
whole belonging are contingent on space in the same way, the question remains as to how
property happens. How or under what conditions does a property become property? Sara
Ahmed’s framework of orientations, which she defines as concerning ‘the intimacy of
bodies and their dwelling places’, provides an innovative way to think about relationships
of belonging (Ahmed, 2007). Ahmed argues that ‘bodies are orientated when they are
occupied in time and space’ and that the way bodies are orientated affects which objects
come near them and what they can do. Drawing on Frantz Fanon, Ahmed argues that
‘doing things’ depends not so much on intrinsic capacity, or even upon dispositions or
habits, but on the ways in which the world is available as a space for action, a space where
things ‘have a certain place’ or ‘are in place’ (Ahmed, 2007). In other words, the world is a
space where things, including bodies, either belong or don’t belong – a space that consists
of networks that give rise to potential relationships of belonging. Ahmed argues that in a
white world, white bodies are orientated such that they move easily and are held up by the
spaces around them. Ahmed’s analysis of whiteness as an orientation is similar to Harris’
whiteness as property in that both see whiteness as allowing the white subject to do certain
things that the non-white subject cannot. But whereas Harris focuses on the privileges of
white subjects and the historical and contemporary legal forces that produce those privi-
leges, Ahmed focuses on the processes in between – not onlywhat white bodies can do and
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why, but also how the spaces around white bodies allow them to do and reach things that
other bodies cannot. This analysis resonates strongly with an understanding of property as
a network of relations in which the subject is embedded –while the subject is embedded in
that particular position within the network, or oriented in that particular way in space, she
is recognized as belonging there, or as having property. Where she is and how she is
oriented in space affects what she can do, which in turn affects who she is – so her position
in a network or in space, whether or not she belongs, affects her identity (though it does not
define it completely). A subject’s status is not essential or fixed but can shift, as can her
orientation. It might be argued then, that a subject has property while she is properly
oriented in a particular space.
Ahmed’s focus on bodies rather than subjects emphasizes the materiality of her analy-
sis – the body is the material thing in which the subject exists and through which the sub-
ject interacts with the material world surrounding her. She argues that spaces become
contoured by being repetitively oriented around some bodies more than others.
What is repeated is a very style of embodiment, a way of inhabiting space, which claims
space by the accumulation of gestures of ‘sinking’ into that space. If whiteness allows bod-
ies to move with comfort through space, and to inhabit the world as if it were home, then
those bodies take up more space. (Ahmed, 2007)
This repetitive shaping of space so that it is oriented around white bodies is what allows
the characteristic of whiteness to become property – a relation of belonging in which the
white body belongs to the space oriented around it and holding it up. For when space is
oriented around the white body, whiteness is experienced as something material – it is
not just a characteristic of the subject, but a recognizable relationship of belonging with
the surrounding space. The white body can be and can move comfortably in the space
that is oriented towards her. This transition from whiteness as belonging to whiteness
as a belonging, or from whiteness as a property to whiteness as property occurs when
the space around the subject takes a similar shape to the networks that construct white-
ness. Those networks, as discussed earlier, are complex and wide-ranging; they include
but are not limited to law. To draw from an example used by Ahmed, when a white per-
son walks into a university meeting, the space is already oriented around her. No one
turns around and stares at her. She knows the language, the customs, the assumptions and
various other material elements of whiteness, and she feels comfortable there. Many
white people have walked into the meeting space before, so it has been shaped to accom-
modate white bodies (Ahmed, 2007). Thus while property is contingent on space, it also
has a material effect on space – property is an ongoing interaction between subjects who
belong (and who don’t belong) and the space surrounding them.
The Temporality of Property: Shaping the Future and
Producing Linear Time
The shaping of spaces so that they are contoured towards particular objects and bodies is
something property does over time. It is the repetition, the habit, the accumulation of ges-
tures that shape the space such that it is oriented towards particular objects or bodies.
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Duration is thus an important element of property. Reflecting on the discussion so far,
I have variously claimed that ‘a subject has property while she is properly oriented in
a particular space’, that ‘it is not so much that the phone is mine, but that the phone and
I are, at a particular moment, in a relationship of belonging’, that ‘my phone only
belongs to me so long as I remain in a space that creates and recognizes my relationship
of belonging with it’ and that the seemingly fixed categories of subject and object and the
relationship of belonging between them are in fact dynamic and contingent. If property is
understood as protean – as a network of relations in which the subject is embedded but
from which the subject can move, or as a proper orientation that can shift – then it makes
sense that time matters to property. Time, as Elizabeth Grosz argues, is an extraordina-
rily complex term which connotes both a singular, unified and whole overarching time,
as well as the numerous specific fragmented durations of each thing or movement
(Grosz, 1999b). Grosz envisages time as a whole as ‘braided, intertwined, a unity of
strands layered over each other’. The braiding of individual times into an overarching
time is what makes possible relations that locate times and durations relative to each
other (Grosz, 1999b). It is what gives time the capacity to link the past and the present
to the future (Grosz, 1999a).
Individual instances of property each have their own time, but property as a concept
also produces an overarching time. An instance of property, such as my relationship with
my phone, has its own duration and also contributes to the production of an overarching
temporality. Property happens when space accommodates the oriented subject, when that
orientation is one where the subject is embedded in a network of relations of belonging.
But while individual instances of property can have any duration, they tend to be long-
lasting. Although it is possible to have property for a short time, relationships of belong-
ing tend to extend over significant periods of time in relation to the lifespan of the subject
and the object. Indeed a certain level of permanence is usually required for something or
someone to belong – if the proper orientation or embedded position in the network is
temporary then it is more likely to be a loan than property, because ultimately it belongs
somewhere else.4 The settled-ness and longevity of instances of property mean that the
individual strands of ‘property time’ to be braided together are long and similarly
aligned. The result is that property produces a strong linkage between past, present and
future. Each occurrence of property is dependent upon the past – networks must have
already turned and interacted in a particular way so that the subject becomes embedded
in them. The phone had to already be put together, functional and for sale and I had to be
in a position to buy it before it became mine. Ahmed argues that ‘what is reachable is
determined precisely by orientations we have already taken’ (Ahmed, 2007) – subjects
and objects do not randomly land in networks of belonging and become embedded there,
but are funnelled into that position by the pre-existing shape of the world around.
But while property’s beginning is dependent on the past, once begun, property is
oriented towards the future. Once a space is shaped around an object or body, it is more
likely to remain there. And the better a space accommodates particular objects or bodies,
the more it encourages similar objects and bodies to settle there in the future. The more
that similar objects and bodies habitually settle in the same space, the more finely that
space comes to be shaped to fit them. As time passes, the contours of the space become
rigid, forming grooves that funnel similar objects and bodies in the same direction, and
Keenan 433
433
 at Templeman Lib/The Librarian on December 1, 2010sls.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
unsettling and deflecting objects and bodies that do not fit. Networks of belonging thus
become shaped such that some subjects are more likely to become embedded in them
than others. This shaping of space over time in the mould of the objects or bodies that
are already embedded in it means that property tends to shape the future in the same
mould as the past.
The strong linkage that property provides between the past, the present and the future
means that property tends to produce linear time, defined by Carol Greenhouse as ‘the
image of time as an irreversible progression of moments, yielding ordinal conceptions
of past, present and future as well as duration’ (Greenhouse, 1996). Property produces lin-
ear time by contouring space such that particular objects and bodies (or, objects and bodies
coming from a particular trajectory) are likely to continue on in that position in the future.
As the shape of the space becomes more rigid, so does the orientation of the objects and
bodies that become embedded there. It is harder for them to turn away; their orientation,
their direction becomes a predictable progression. Once I own my phone I make it my
own, filling it with my friends’ contact details, choosing a ring-tone, putting it in a partic-
ular place when I am at home and another when I am out, I become comfortable using it –
people come to recognize both the physical phone and the number attached to it as belong-
ing to me. I adapt my life to having a mobile phone, changing the way I organize my time
and my interpersonal relationships to the extent that I feel lost without it. Similarly, once
an institutional space like a university meeting is established as white, it encourages more
white people to feel comfortable there, to feel like they belong.Once accommodated in the
meeting space, white people are then unlikely to reorient it so that it does not as readily
accommodate them. Once an embedded relationship of belonging has been established,
an intervention, something unexpected, is required to change it.Without such an interven-
tion, a world organized around property relationships tends to continue forward with what
Grosz describes as the ‘uniform, regular beat (that) generates an objective, measurable
clock time’ (Grosz, 1999b). The homogenizing tendency of linear or clock time makes
it fit with hegemonic agendas and with the maintenance of the status quo. The linear time
produced by property thus tends to help the world retain its shape.
The shape of the world retained in part by property is one that is organized around
relationships of belonging that, over time, can become so engraved in space that they
appear to be inevitable or natural. Networks of belonging tend to outlast the lifespan
of the subject – after the subject’s death or departure, the space that was carved out to
accommodate her remains, waiting to be filled by another similarly shaped subject. Prop-
erty, both in terms of whole–part and subject–object belonging, tend to be passed down
within the nuclear family. Ahmed argues that ‘we inherit proximities (and hence orien-
tations) as our point of entry into a familial space’ and that this inheritance generates
‘likeness’ – I am like my sister because I have been shaped in the same space as her,
because our identities have touched and enveloped each other; but that ‘likeness’ is seen
as sharing a characteristic (Ahmed, 2007). That is, the effects of property – having cer-
tain spaces orient around you and having certain objects within reach – in turn generates
further property. This reproduction of property beyond the lifespan of individual subjects
happens most obviously within families but also in broader social categories that are
understood as sharing characteristics, or belonging in a particular place. ‘In the case
of race’, Ahmed argues, ‘we would say that bodies come to be seen as ‘‘alike’’, as for
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instance ‘‘sharing whiteness’’ as a ‘‘characteristic’’, as an effect of such proximities,
where certain ‘‘things’’ are already ‘‘in place’’’ (Ahmed, 2007). Ahmed also discusses
the normalization of heterosexuality in terms of some bodies (those of the ‘opposite sex’)
being seen as directed towards or made for each other – as belonging together (Ahmed,
2006). Like whiteness, heterosexuality is a property that often operates as property –
spaces tend to be oriented around heterosexual bodies and to repel or unsettle queer ones.
The same could be argued for masculinity, ability, class and other identity characteristics
that are understood as natural or inevitable properties and towards which space is
oriented. That is, those characteristics, and the identity groupings based upon them, are
produced by networks of belonging, by inherited orientations that become fixed in space,
defined by the past and reproductive of a future along the same trajectory.
Subversive Property – Unsettling Spaces and Reshaping
the Future
The two examples I have been using to illustrate the spatiality and temporality of prop-
erty could both be described as instances of hegemonic property. The privileges associ-
ated with whiteness and with mobile phone ownership both operate as dominant social
forces and are protected by or at least consistent with law. The argument that these kinds
of property shape the future in the same mould as the past is not new – Marxist and race
theorists have long argued that private property and white privilege respectively are
reproductive of hegemonic power relations. What is different about this analysis is firstly
that both subject–object and whole–part belonging are analysed as spatially contingent
property and secondly that the spatial contingency of property means that it is malleable.
The spatial and temporal contingency of property means that it can be reshaped.
Networks of belonging that enable property do not have to be oppressive, exploitative
or conservative. The two empirical studies reviewed earlier demonstrate not only that
property is experienced in complex and overlapping ways not solely determined by prop-
erty law, but also that property can be productive of social goods in a way that subverts
hegemonic power relations. This is a broader argument than one asserting that ‘public
property’, meaning property owned by the state and ostensibly available for all to use,
produces shared social goods. The property in these studies is not ‘public property’ – the
school and the bathtubs are ‘privately’ owned – yet they are experienced as something in
between public and private property by those who engage with them. At any rate, ‘public
property’ tends to be more available and useful to some than others – women and trans-
gendered people are less likely to be able to comfortably walk through a public park at
night; those from non-English-speaking backgrounds are less likely to find books they
need at the local library; indigenous people are less likely to enjoy the public holiday
held to commemorate the founding of the colonial state. The property examined in
Cooper’s and Blomley’s studies is not proclaimed to be of universal availability or use.
As Cooper shows in her work on Summerhill, property practices can play a productive
role in contributing to community life (Cooper, 2007). So, for example, the school’s col-
lective, democratic response to property breaches and the reassertion of rights that hap-
pens in that process (re)produce a sense of collective identity (Cooper, 2007). Blomley’s
examination of the overlapping private and public property understandings and practices
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in regards to the flowers in the boulevard bathtubs also shows that this extra-legal prop-
erty can contribute to a shared public good, in that case a mainly aesthetic one (Blomley,
2005). In both examples there is a merging of property as a subject’s rights over an object
(subject–object belonging) and property as a part of the subject’s identity (whole–part
belonging), with both types of belonging, or what could be seen as the merging of the
two, having a material effect on the surrounding space. At Summerhill, students’ and
teachers’ rights over things (subject–object belonging) are tempered by the rules of com-
munity membership (whole–part belonging), and the interaction of these belongings pro-
duces the unique space of the school – both its material layout (staffrooms that allow
student access, private bedrooms that tend to be widely shared, students’ things such
as clothes and tools arranged in such a way that they are not permanently given away)
and its non-hierarchical, non-moralistic sense of community (Cooper, 2007). In Strath-
cona, residents’ perception of their rights over the bathtubs (subject–object belonging)
were in part determined by their perception of their community membership (whole–part
belonging) – some would not pick flowers from the tub because it would be taking from
the wider collective of their neighbourhood (Blomley, 2005).
While neither of these examples involved networks of belonging that explicitly
contravened state property laws, both involved networks of belonging that were extra-
legal – they were not defined by state law but by individual and community practices
and understandings. They also both exist in a state of tension with the law – Summerhill
was threatened with closure by the British Department for Education in 2000, and the
flowers in the bathtub probably breach Vancouver’s Encroachment By-laws. The prop-
erty practices at Summerhill and in the Strathcona neighbourhood both involve objects
and bodies positioned in ways that are out of place according to conventional under-
standings of belonging (flowers in bathtubs on the pavement, children alongside teachers
in managerial meetings) and the legal manifestations of those understandings (encroach-
ment by-laws, standardized educational requirements). The alternative property prac-
tices in both examples have an effect on both the subjects’ identities and the
surrounding physical space – differently shaped spaces are carved out. The result is a
space that is unsettled in terms of its position within hegemonic understandings of prop-
erty that are enshrined in law and that tend to dominate space.
While Summerhill school and the Strathcona neighbourhood are small-scale exam-
ples, the potential to unsettle spaces through extra-legal property practices has much
broader political significance. Because space is dynamic and heterogeneous, and prop-
erty is a spatially contingent occurrence, all spaces are unsettled to some degree – there
will always exist networks of belonging that sit in tension with the dominant one. Some
spaces seem more unsettled than others – land in postcolonial settler states being a clear
example. Nick Blomley and Irene Watson have both explicitly written of such land as
‘unsettled spaces’. Blomley argues that one of the reasons settler Canada relies on a
system of land title – whereby property is vested exclusively in a particular subject or
subjects – is that it gives an assurance that the claim to property is uncontested, that
‘ownership is complete and zero-sum’, that only the owner and the land are recognized
as being in a relationship of belonging (Blomley, 2004). Alain Pottage has also shown
how systems of registration of land title impose a linear or rational perspective upon the
landscape, making land ‘a calculable and finite surface rather than a lived and
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remembered medium’ (Pottage, 1994). Legal geography literature also shows how law
tends to treat space as a pre-existing, a-social reality – a blank, neutral canvass upon and
over which social relations take place, rather than something that is itself socially con-
stituted and constitutive (Blomley, 1994). As has been discussed above, land is not a cal-
culable and finite surface, but an ever-evolving medium, and one that involves multiple
processes and relations that extend far beyond the land itself.
The lived and remembered aspects of land are particularly important to indigenous
people, whose networks of belonging to the land are not recognized by law or by the domi-
nant settler culture. The process of white settlement upon land that was once occupied by
indigenous people is an ongoing one. Indigenous claims to property in land have never
ceased, despite the state system of title that rejects them, and despite other state measures
for silencing indigenous dissent to the hegemonic property system (measures such as
incarceration and surveillance). Indigenous voices continue to assert an ontological rela-
tion to land – that country is constitutive of their being and that their relationship with land
is thus inalienable, asserting a relation of belonging to the land that unsettles the space
(Moreton-Robinson, 2003). This is not in any way to deny the very real impact of law and
its ongoing refusal to recognize different understandings and experiences of property.
Rather it is simply to point out the cracks in law – to recognize the reality of subversive
property in order to explore its possibilities. Indigenous claims of belonging will be, as
Irene Watson argues, ‘forever a challenge to the settled spaces of the colony’ (Watson,
2007). Moreton-Robinson similarly argues that indigenous subjectivity is ‘a state of
embodiment that continues to unsettle white Australia’ (Moreton-Robinson, 2003).
The existence of subversive property and the unsettling of spaces cut across both the
material–discursive and the subject–object/whole–part dichotomies. The ongoing pres-
ence of indigenous people who continue to resist assimilation into the hegemonic white
culture disrupts the material landscape of settler states. Although state policies have sys-
tematically removed indigenous property to remote areas far from view (or to contained
museums where the view is regulated), indigenous networks of belonging have never
been erased completely. The very existence of remote indigenous communities taints the
hegemonic understanding of Australia as one postcolonial nation with settled networks
of belonging, a cohesive system of land title and a future carved along the same path.
This material tainting of the landscape is not restricted to remote indigenous commu-
nities but also affects the spaces of the cities, where indigenous bodies and practices
seem out of place. This persistent out-of-placeness is a material manifestation of subver-
sive property; it unsettles the space. While this kind of out-of-place presence has been
described by Moreton-Robinson as an example of the white system allowing indigenous
people to occupy but not to possess Australian space (Moreton-Robinson, 2003), this
occupation itself carves out property, asserting a network of belonging and disturbing the
surrounding space. The Aboriginal Tent Embassy on the lawns of Parliament House in
Canberra is an example of subversive property from the Australian context, and subver-
sive property has been used as a political tactic in other contexts – subjects can change a
space by refusing to leave it, or by refusing to orient themselves in the way the space was
designed. Painting graffiti art on the Israel–Palestine partition wall, dancing and playing
music inside police cordons and planting flowers in a bathtub on the boulevard are exam-
ples of subversive property that materially change the surrounding space. This material
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unsettling of space also undermines the discourse that accompanies the dominant under-
standing of the space, throwing into question the systems and policies against which sub-
versive property seems out of place. Subversive property disrupts the linear time
produced by hegemonic networks of belonging. Through introducing things that do not
belong or bodies that are not properly oriented, subversive property interferes with the
long alignment of braided durations that constitute the proprietal link between past, pres-
ent and future. Adopting this spatial understanding of property thus allows room for the
future to be reshaped.
Notes
This research was funded by the University of Kent Law School and the Overseas Research
Students’ Assistance Scheme. Thank you to Davina Cooper, Sarah Lamble, Toni Williams, Emily
Grabham and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts.
1. There is an assumption of able-bodiedness because the body must be capable of labouring/
working the land.
2. At least not conquest in its traditional form of one sovereign power taking control of another
people by military force. Many would argue that conquest continues in other forms today, par-
ticularly in ‘postcolonial’ settler states.
3. I am using the term law here to refer to the body of rules produced by the state through the par-
liament and the courts. An alternative approach to the questions posed in this article would be to
explore whether different kinds of property can be understood as alternative legalities, but this
is not the focus of my study. For a compelling exploration of what amounts to law, see Irene
Watson (2002).
4. Although what counts as temporary depends on the network of belonging – financial trading is
an example of a network where relations of belonging can be very short term but are still recog-
nized and upheld as property.
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